The Haze Problem in Southeast Asia by Helena Varkkey

Author:Helena Varkkey [Helena Varkkey]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781317511106
Publisher: Routledge

Patronage relationships are ‘amorphous, latent, elusive, and ubiquitous’ (Scott, 1972: 92–113). As an extension of the simple dyadic patronage link, patronage politics refers to the overall pattern of patronage linkages joining the actors in a given area or community (Scott, 1972: 92–113).

Patrons and clients are almost exclusively motivated by material gain (Kurer, 1996: 645–661). In this way, patronage politics can be seen as ‘a form of domination that is used by modern political and economic elites to channel resources for their own benefit’ (Gunes-Ayata, 1994: 17–26). This is why they are usually regarded as disreputable, if not illegal, by parties external to this relationship (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1995: 209–233).

According to Kurer (1996: 645–661), ‘patrons and clients have an interest in replacing collective with private goods, and one way of accomplishing this is to override bureaucratic procedures and allocate resources not according to bureaucratic norms (or set policies) but on the basis of political interest’. An important contemporary resource base available to a potential patron is indirect, office-based property (Scott, 1972: 92–113). This involves office holders who hold discretionary powers over scarce values such as employment, promotion, assistance, welfare, licensing and permits (Scott, 1972: 92–113). For example, an office-holding patron can offer privileges to property rights to generate economic rent, or income-earning opportunities such as licenses to generate an income above opportunity costs (Kurer, 1996: 645–661). This is illustrated clearly later in this chapter, where well-connected plantation companies in Indonesia are able to obtain privileged rights to choice parcels of land for development of oil palm plantations (Rukmantara [I45], 2011; Suwarsono [I3], 2010; Tarigan [I23], 2010,), despite contrary laws and policies that exist. It is this combination of potentially open access to markets with the continuous semi-institutionalized attempts to limit free access that is the crux of the patronage politics model (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1995: 209–233).

An excellent way for a political leader to stay in power is to ensure that he is always surrounded by loyal followers. Hence, he may calculate that some inefficiency in the system is a small price to pay for said loyalty. Patronage ‘allows leaders to build a team of public managers who share the leaders’ policy agenda and who can be trusted not to sabotage or delay important programs’ (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2004: 163–182). In such conditions, there often arise situations of ‘mutual hostage’ relations, which Enderwick (2005: 129) describes as situations ‘where the principal partners (politicians and business leaders) become locked into a situation of mutual dependency, where change by one threatens the well-being of the other’. Such mutual hostage relations severely restricts state capacity to create or uphold effective policies, as powerful patrons in the government or administration are locked into making policy choices that reflect the interests of their client, with little consideration of the interests of the society at large.

One of the main things that differentiate patronage politics from a one-off bribe is the ongoing nature of the relationship. Patronage politics is essentially a reiterated interaction, with each side making decisions about their behaviour today in the anticipation of future interactions.

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